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Heralded single photon sources for QKD applications
Matteo Schiavon,1, ∗ Giuseppe Vallone,1 Francesco Ticozzi,1 and Paolo Villoresi1
1Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell’Informazione, Universita` di Padova, via Gradenigo 6/B, 35131 Padova, Italy
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Single photon sources (SPS) are a fundamental building block for optical implementations of
quantum information protocols. Among SPSs, multiple crystal heralded single photon sources seem
to give the best compromise between high pair production rate and low multiple photon events.
In this work, we study their performance in a practical quantum key distribution experiment, by
evaluating the achievable key rates. The analysis focuses on the two different schemes, symmetric
and asymmetric, proposed for the practical implementation of heralded single photon sources, with
attention on the performance of their composing elements. The analysis is based on the protocol
proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 and on its improvement exploiting decoy state technique.
Finally, a simple way of exploiting the post-selection mechanism for a passive, one decoy state scheme
is evaluated.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to al-
low two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to share a secret
key even in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Since
in quantum mechanics measurements irremediably per-
turb the systems, it is impossible for an eavesdropper to
extract useful information without being noticed. Quan-
tum key distribution protocols, like the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol [1], are proven to be uncondition-
ally secure, when using single photons. However, due to
the spread of laser systems and the difficulty of realiz-
ing true single photon sources, most QKD implementa-
tions use attenuated pulsed lasers as sources. The need
to avoid multi-photon pulses, that can leak information
through the photon number splitting (PNS) attack [2],
requires a low mean photon number per pulse. This,
however, increments the incidence of pulses containing
no photons, thus limiting the key generation rate. The
incidence of the PNS attack can be limited using the de-
coy state technique [3–5], at the expenses of the necessity
to modulate the laser intensity. These limitations have
encouraged the research of sources emitting a single pho-
ton for each pulse.
One possible implementation of these sources is based
on localized quantum structures, such as color centres
[6], quantum dots [7, 8], atoms [9] or ions [10] in a cavity.
These schemes, however, show some major drawbacks:
the need of expensive equipment for their operation and
limitations in wavelength and bandwidth selection [11].
An alternative scheme for single photon sources exploits
the process of spontaneous parametric down conversion
(SPDC) in a non-linear crystal. An intense laser pump on
a non-linear crystal leads to the probabilistic emission of
pairs of photons, called signal and idler. The idler pho-
ton can be used to “herald” the presence of the signal
∗Electronic address: matteoschiav@yahoo.it
photon, giving the so called heralded source (HS). If the
duration of the pulse is much greater than the recipro-
cal of the phase-matching bandwidth the statistics of the
pairs is still poissonian [11]. There are some strategies
for improving the single-photon character of the heralded
source. One strategy consists in using a single HS with
photon number resolving detector on the idler channel
and selecting the pulses where only one photon has been
detected [12]. An alternative strategy uses parallel HS
units and post-selection: each unit is pumped with low
intensity to suppress multi-photon events, while keeping
the overall rate at an acceptable level. The scheme of
multiple HS with post-selection (MHPS) has been origi-
nally proposed by Migdall et al. [13]: it used an m-to-1
optical switch triggered by a detector on the idler photon
of each HS. Migdall et al. took into account also the finite
efficiency of single photon detectors but, as pointed out
by Shapiro and Wong [11], the current low efficiency ofm-
to-1 optical switches strongly limits the performance of
this architecture. To overcome this limitation, they pro-
posed a symmetric scheme (SMHPS) using m HS units
linked bym−1 binary polarization-based photon switches
in a tree structure [11], see Fig. 1. They studied the prob-
ability of single-photon and multi-photon pulses, with
real detectors and optical switches. Their scheme has
been subsequently implemented using 4 crystals, both
with bulk optics [14] and using hybrid photonic circuits
[15].
A thorough analysis of multiple heralded sources with
post-selection has been performed in [16]. From their
work, it emerges that, in the case of imperfect devices, the
symmetric scheme suffers from a scalability issue, with a
decrease in one photon probability when increasing the
number of crystals. In [16], a new asymmetric scheme
(AMHPS) that does not present this problem was also
proposed. The scheme is shown in Fig. 2 for complete-
ness. The SMHPS and AMHPS schemes were also re-
ferred respectively as log-tree and chained scheme in [17].
Sub-poissonian sources have already been demon-
strated to give an improvement over poissonian ones in
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2the key rate of a QKD system [12, 18]. This article spe-
cializes the analysis to the case of the multiple-crystal
heralded photon sources studied in [16], parametrizing
them using their design parameters instead of the more
experimentally relevant efficiency and second-order cor-
relation. Moreover, the security analysis is extended to
the case of general attacks by Eve [19].
In this work, we follow [16], and compare the perfor-
mances of the different architectures and their efficacy
in a practical QKD implementation. An ideal MHPS in
the configuration proposed by Migdall et al., with perfect
heralding efficiency and an m-to-1 optical switch with no
losses, is studied first, in order to give an account of the
maximum performance that can be obtained with this
kind of sources. Next, two architectures for implementing
a multiplexed source in a realistic scenario are analyzed,
based on symmetric and asymmetric networks of 2-to-1
switches. Finite heralding efficiency and optical switch
transmittance are considered in order to illustrate the
potential of these source with state-of-the-art technology.
The different types of sources are inserted in a common
model of QKD, based on the BB84 protocol and tak-
ing into account channel and detector inefficiencies [19].
The optimization maximizes the key generation rate for
the different architectures, with different numbers of HS
units, for a wide range of channel losses. The obtained
values are then compared with the key generation rate
of both an ideal single photon source and an attenuated
laser.
The symmetric and asymmetric schemes are also op-
timized when used with decoy states [3, 4], both in an
active [5] and in a passive scheme [20, 21]. The active
scheme, where Alice actively changes the output statis-
tics of its apparatus, allows her to choose an arbitrary
number of decoy states, giving her the ability to estimate
channel parameters with arbitrary precision. Passive de-
coy, on the other hand, is implemented by exploiting pho-
ton number correlations of the two outputs of non-linear
crystals [20]. This gives less flexibility in the choice of
the decoy states, thus limiting the precision of parame-
ter estimation, but allows to reach a key generation rate
comparable with active decoy without introducing fur-
ther complexity in Alice’s apparatus.
II. MODEL
To evaluate the performances of the heralded single
photon sources, we consider the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) QKD protocol [1] with polarization encoding. Al-
ice, the transmitter, encodes the random bits into the
Z ≡ {|H〉, |V 〉} or the X ≡ {|D〉, |A〉} basis, where H,
V , D and A refer to the horizontal, vertical, diagonal and
anti-diagonal polarization respectively. Bob randomly
measures the incoming photon into the Z or X basis.
After the transmission, Alice and Bob discard the events
in which the sent and measured basis are different. On
the remaining events, they evaluate the secret key rate,
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the SMHPS [11]. Each non-linear crys-
tal (NLC) is fed with pulses such that the mean number of
generated pair per pulse is µ/γk, with k = log2m and γ is
the transmittance of 2-to-1 optical switches. The idler of each
NLC is fed into a detector with quantum efficiency η.
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FIG. 2: Schematics of the AMHPS [16]. Each non-linear
crystal (NLC) is pumped with a different intensity in order
to compensate the different number of traversed 2-to-1 optical
switches, each characterized by its transmittance γ. The idler
of each NLC is fed into a detector with quantum efficiency η.
namely the amount of unconditional secret bits that they
have produced.
The single photon source held by Alice is completely
described by its output statistics. We indicate the prob-
ability of emitting n photon by PMn (µ;m) for the MHPS
and PSn (µ;m, η, γ) and P
A
n (µ;m, η, γ) for the SMHPS
and the AMHPS, respectively [16] (see Appendix A for
a more detailed description of the different architectures
and the explicit expressions of PMn , P
S
n and P
A
n ) . The
source is pumped by a pulsed laser, with phase random-
ization between each pulse [19]. The variable µ is pro-
portional to the intensity of the pump laser, which is
related to the mean number of pairs generated by each
HS per pulse. The sources are parametrized by the num-
ber of non-linear crystals (i.e. of HS units) m and, for
the SMHPS and the AMHPS, by the efficiency of the
heralding detectors η and the transmittance of the op-
tical switches γ. For γ → 1, the scheme used in the
3switching network is no longer significant, therefore the
output statistics of the two architectures coincide. If the
heralding efficiency η → 1 as well, the two architectures
become equivalent to the ideal MHPS.
We used as model for the QKD channel a depolarizing
lossy channel (DLC), characterized by a transmittance
t = 10−
L
10 , with L the loss level in decibel, and a depo-
larization effect with visibility V , that takes into account
also alignment and stability issues.
The receiver consists of an optical apparatus, charac-
terized by transmittance tB , and two single photon de-
tectors, each with quantum efficiency ηB and dark count
probability pd. They are threshold detectors, i.e. they
cannot discriminate the number of incident photons. As-
suming the effects of the channel on each photon of an
n-photon pulse are independent, the probability that a
detector clicks, when an n-photon signal is sent, is
ηn = 1− (1− ηDtBt)n. (1)
The parameters used for the evaluation of the secret
key rate are the gain Q, defined as the probability that
a pulse gives a click in Bob’s measurement apparatus,
and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) E, i.e. the error
probability in Bob’s detection events. These are the only
measurable parameters during a QKD experiment. For
the DLC they can be estimated as follow (see also [5]).
The gain is defined as
Q =
∞∑
n=0
YnPn, (2)
where Pn is the probability of having n photons in a pulse
and Yn is the yield of an n-photon signal, i.e. the condi-
tional probability of a detection event at Bob’s side given
that Alice sends n photons. Assuming independence be-
tween signal and background, the yield of an n-photon
pulse for a DLC can be predicted to be
Y˜n = Y˜0 + ηn − Y˜0ηn ' Y˜0 + ηn, (3)
where Y0 is the probability of a dark count event, which
is Y˜0 ' 2pd in the case of two independent detectors and
small dark count probability. From now on we use the
convention of indicating with tilde the predicted param-
eters for a DLC. The negative term, coming from the
fact that real detection events and dark counts are not
mutually exclusive, can be neglected, since Y0  1.
The QBER is defined by
E =
1
Q
∞∑
n=0
enYnPn, (4)
where en is the n-photon error rate, i.e. the probability
of an error when Alice sends a n-photon state. For a
DLC the n-photon error rate can be predicted to be
e˜n =
e˜0Y˜0 + e˜dηn
Y˜n
, (5)
where e˜0 =
1
2 is the error probability of a dark count
event, which is assumed to be random, and e˜d =
1−V
2 is
the probability that a photon hits the wrong detector.
III. SECRET KEY RATE
After the transmission, Alice and Bob use post-
processing to extract a shared, secret key from the ex-
changed symbols. The secret key rate R is defined as
the fraction of pulses that produce a secret bit (without
counting those discarded in the sifting phase) [19]. Its
high dependence on source statistics makes it the most
suitable parameter for the comparison of the different
configurations.
A. BB84 without decoy state
The rate of the BB84 protocol is limited by the fact
that Eve can, in principle, obtain full information from a
multi-photon pulse through the photon number splitting
(PNS) attack, without introducing any error [2]. In the
asymptotic limit of infinite key, the achievable key rate
is
R = Q{(1−∆)[1− h
(
E
1−∆
)
]− fECh(E)}, (6)
where ∆ is the multi-photon rate, defined as
∆ =
1− P0 − P1
Q
, (7)
fEC is the error correction efficiency and h(x) is the bi-
nary Shannon entropy [19, 22]. For true single photon
sources ∆ = 0 and the secret key rate is written as
R = Q[1−h(E)−fECh(E)]: the correction term 1−∆ in
(6), indeed, takes into account the possible PNS attack
on the multi-photon pulses.
B. BB84 with active decoy
The decoy state technique has been introduced to
counteract the PNS attack [4]. It consists on randomly
varying the source statistic, so that Eve can no longer
adapt her attack to Alice’s state. After the transmis-
sion, Alice communicates Bob the state she used for ev-
ery pulse, allowing them to estimate channel parameters
conditioned to that knowledge.
The decoy state technique is active in the sense that
Alice chooses the output statistics using a random num-
ber generator and (typically) a variable attenuator af-
ter the source. In principle, she can choose an arbitrary
number of decoy states: however it has been shown that
just using the vacuum and a weak decoy state gives tight
4bounds on the relevant parameters [5]. In the asymptotic
limit of infinite key, the key rate is
R = P0Y0 + P1Y1[1− h(e1)]−QfECh(E), (8)
where P0 and P1 are given by the source statistics in the
signal state and the parameters e1, Y0 and Y1 are the
channel parameters estimated using decoy states [5, 23].
Following [19], we make the simplifying assumption that
the parameters have been determined exactly.
C. BB84 with passive decoy
In passive decoy state QKD, the source statistics is not
under Alice’s direct control, but is conditioned on some
random event at Alice’s side. A typical example consists
in an attenuate coherent state passing through a 50/50
beam splitter (BS) with a single photon detector at the
reflected output: the photon statistic at the transmitting
output of the BS changes when Alice detects or not a
photon. In the case of heralded sources, we denote by
P
(c)
n or P
(nc)
n the output statistics if, respectively, at least
one detector or no detector clicks (see Appendix B for
the explicit form of these probabilities for the different
architectures). We note that P
(nc)
n is not trivial since in
both schemes the post-selection mechanism outputs the
first HS if no detector fires [16]. This feature can be used
to implement a passive decoy state, since Eve has no way
of distinguishing the statistics of each pulse before it is
publicly announced.
Assuming the post-processing is done separately for
each statistics, the key rate is
R = P cRc + PncRnc, (9)
where Rc and Rnc are the key rate for, respectively, the
case of at least one detector and no detector clicking.
The key rate is, in the limit of infinite key,
Rξ = P
(ξ)
0 Y
L
0 +P
(ξ)
1 Y
L
1 [1−h(eU1 )]−QξfECh(Eξ), (10)
where ξ ∈ {c, nc}, Qξ and Eξ are the parameters esti-
mated from the pulses in the corresponding statistics and
Y L0 , Y
L
1 , e
U
1 are the lower (L) and upper (U) bounds for
the parameters estimated from {Qc, Ec, Qnc, Enc} and
the known source statistics. The explicit formulas for
parameter estimation, derived from [24], are given in Ap-
pendix B in eqs. (B10), (B13) and (B19).
IV. RESULTS
In the present section we compare the performances
of the SMHPS and AMHPS sources for different values
of m, namely the number of HS units considered. The
parameter µ, related to the number of generated pairs per
pulse, is the free parameter used to numerically maximize
the rate.
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FIG. 3: Key rate for the MHPS architecture in function of
channel losses.
For the channel and detector parameters, we used typ-
ical values of present day fibre-based QKD systems [19].
We consider a channel with visibility V = 0.99 and losses
ranging from 0 to 55 dB (we note that 55 dB corresponds
to 275 km if we consider the typical fibre attenuation of
α = 0.2 dB/km). Bob’s apparatus is characterized by
optical transmittance tB = 1 and detectors with quan-
tum efficiency ηB = 0.25 and dark count probability
pd = 2 · 10−7, corresponding to the state-of-the-art of
infrared semiconductor single photon detectors [25]. The
efficiency of the error correction code is fEC = 1.05 [26].
All the simulated key rates are compared with the one
obtained with an attenuated laser source (WCS) of pois-
sonian output statistics Pn = e
−µµn/n!, where µ is the
mean number of photons per pulse, both without and
with decoy state. In the passive scheme, the comparison
is extended to the one decoy state with attenuated laser
described in [5], where also the inefficiencies in parame-
ter estimation are taken into account. Furthermore, all
schemes are compared with the single photon case, repre-
senting an upper bound of the rate attainable in a given
configuration.
In the following subsections the performances of the
heralded single photon source are compared in different
cases.
A. Performances of BB84 without decoy state
The ideal MHPS gives the maximum key rate attain-
able with this kind of sources [16]. This value is shown in
Figure 3. The key rate increases with the number of HS
units and approaches the single photon case for m = 128,
in the low loss regime. Indeed, for m → ∞, ∆ = O(µ)
5and Q ' 1, approximating the single photon case for
µ  1. At increasing losses, however, the contribution
of multi-photon pulses increases and the source shows
the same behaviour as the attenuated laser. This had
already been observed in [18], with the difference that,
for low m, not only the fraction of multi-photon pulses
is higher, determining the lower maximum tolerable loss
level, but also the incidence of pulses with zero photons
is stronger, determining the lower key rate at L = 0 dB.
While these limitations are proper of the multiple-
crystal architecture itself, the implementation using finite
efficiency devices further reduces the key generation rate.
Using η = 0.7 and γ = 0.5 as, respectively, heralding effi-
ciency and switch transmittance [16], the key generation
rate of the SMHPS and the AMHPS has the values shown
in Figure 4. Both the key rate and the maximum toler-
able losses are lower than for the ideal MHPS, since the
low switch transmittance requires a higher mean number
of generated pairs per pulse in order to avoid zero-photon
pulses, thus increasing also the incidence of multi-photon
pulses. This effect is particularly evident in the case of
the SMHPS, where, independently from the HS unit trig-
gered to output, the number of switches crossed scales
as k = log2m. For few HS units, where the number
of crossed switches is low, the predominant effect is the
suppression of multi-photon events, therefore the key rate
increases with m. For a higher number of HS units (such
as m = 32 or m = 128), the source shows a low key rate
for low losses (not much higher than the attenuated laser
one) and a high maximum tolerable loss level. In the
limit m → ∞, any advantage over the attenuated laser
is lost.
On the other hand, the AMHPS has a more stable be-
haviour, since its key rate never decreases by increasing
m, but reaches an optimal value and then remains un-
changed (the key rates for m = 8 and m = 128 are almost
equal). This is due to the fact that, when a certain num-
ber of HS units has been reached, the addition of further
HS units does not yield significant improvement, since
the probability that the rightmost HS units are triggered
to the output is negligible and the output is given only
by the leftmost HS units, whose configuration does not
change (see Figure 2).
The different behaviour of the two architectures is even
more evident when studying their key rate at the varia-
tion of the two relevant source parameters, the detection
efficiency η and the switch transmittance γ. The key rate
of the SMHPS and the AMHPS is shown, respectively,
in Figures 5 and 6, when fixing η = 0.7 and changing γ
on the left and with fixed γ = 0.5 and changing η on the
right. The behaviour of the SMHPS is highly depen-
dent on the switch transmittance. For low γ, the benefits
deriving from multiple HS units do not compensate the
higher absorption rate. As evident from Figure 5, for
γ < 0.5 the SMHPS does not perform much better than
the attenuated laser. This is consistent with the results
from [16], where it has been shown that, in the asymp-
totic limit m → ∞, the SMHPS performs better than
the attenuated laser for γ ≥ 0.5. The curve γ = 0.5 cor-
responds to the transition between the laser-like regime
and the MHPS-like one.
The effect of the detector efficiency η is evident in the
high loss regime, where the influence of the lower number
of multi-photon pulses is more important. This can be
evinced from the right plot of Figure 5, where the detec-
tion efficiency η is varied for the case γ = 0.5. In the
low loss regime, the key rate is the same for all values
of η, showing that in this region the dominating effect is
photon absorption in the optical routing. On the other
hand, the high loss regime shows an improvement in the
maximum tolerable loss level from 21 dB for η = 0.1 to
26 dB for η = 1. The increased detection efficiency allows
a better choice of the HS unit to route to output, thus
allowing the HS units to be pumped with less intensity
and decreasing the incidence of multi-photon pulses.
The key rate curves of the AMHPS, on the contrary,
show the same trend for all tested combinations (η, γ). In
the asymmetric scheme, indeed, photons emitted by the
leftmost HS units pass a low number of optical switches
before being routed to output, therefore the effect of pho-
ton absorption never dominates over multi-photon pulses.
B. Performances of BB84 with decoy state
The key rate for active decoy is obtained by using equa-
tion (8), with e1, Y0 and Y1 calculated by using the chan-
nel parameters given in (5) and (3). The results of sim-
ulations are shown in Figure 7. The normalized mean
number of generated pairs that maximizes the key rate is
almost constant for both sources in the range ∼ 0.6−0.9,
with a steep fall in the regime where dark counts be-
come important. The rate of the SMHPS decreases as
the number of crystals increases, thus further underlin-
ing the detrimental effect of the increased absorption in
optical switches. The AMHPS, on the other hand, does
not show any improvement for more than 4 HS units,
because the probability of triggering the rightmost HS
units is negligible (see Appendix A).
Since in the proposed implementation of passive decoy
the bound on channel parameters is no longer optimal,
simulations have to take into account also this effect on
the key rate. Therefore, the key rate is calculated by in-
serting the bounds for e1, Y0 and Y1 into (10) and taking
into account the fraction of pulses using each statistics
with equation (9). Simulation results are shown in Fig-
ure 8. The use of just two different statistics gives a non-
optimal parameter estimation, so a lower key rate than
the schemes using active decoy. To account for this, the
rates in Figure 8 are compared also with a similar, one
decoy scheme implemented with attenuated laser pulses
[5]. The worse bound on the parameters gives a worse es-
timation of the information leaked to Eve, thus requiring
the sources to be pumped with lower intensity than in
the case of active decoy (the normalized mean number of
generated pairs oscillates, in this case, between 0.2 and
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FIG. 4: Key rate of the SMHPS (left) and the AMHPS (right), with η = 0.7 and γ = 0.5 for BB84 without decoy state. For
the AMHPS (right), the curves for m = 8, m = 32 and m = 128 are superposed.
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FIG. 5: Key rate (without decoy state) for the SMHPS for m = 32 and (left) η = 0.7 and different values of γ, (right) γ = 0.5
and different values of η.
0.3). The performance of the SMHPS is comparable, or
slightly worse, to the one of decoy state with attenuated
lasers, because of the already discussed detrimental ef-
fect on the source caused by optical switch attenuation.
On the other hand, the key rate of the AMHPS is always
higher than the one obtained with the attenuated laser in
the one decoy scheme and almost reaches the maximum
tolerable loss level of the attenuated laser with decoy. As
in all previous schemes, the AMHPS shows no improve-
ment after a certain threshold of HS units is reached (in
this case, m = 4).
The comparison of the two sources in the two different
decoy schemes of Figure 9 directly shows the advantage
of the AMHPS over the SMHPS. Indeed, the asymmet-
ric scheme performs better than the passive one in both
active and passive decoy. Furthermore, the key rate of
the AMHPS in the passive scheme almost equals both
the SMHPS and the attenuated laser with decoy, despite
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FIG. 7: Key rate of active decoy state QKD for the SMHPS (left) and the AMHPS (right), with η = 0.7 and γ = 0.5. For
the SMHPS (left), the curves are very close, with m = 32 the lowest curve. In the AMHPS case (right), the lowest curve has
m = 2, while all the others are superposed.
the worse parameter estimation caused by the use of just
one decoy state.
V. CONCLUSION
The multiple-crystal heralded sources have shown bet-
ter performance than the attenuated laser in all the stud-
ied cases, with the only exception of the SMHPS in the
one decoy scheme, where the high absorption in optical
switches, together with an imperfect parameter estima-
tion, completely overrules the enhancement given by the
multiple crystal configuration. The AMHPS shows bet-
ter scalability than the SMHPS, since in the latter the
addition of HS units can degrade the performance while
in the former it has, in the worst case scenario, no effect.
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FIG. 8: Key rate for passive decoy state QKD for the SMHPS (left) and the AMHPS (right), with η = 0.7 and γ = 0.5.
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FIG. 9: Key rate for the SMHPS and the AMHPS for both
active and passive decoy with m = 8, η = 0.7 and γ = 0.5.
In addition to this, the key rate of the AMHPS is gen-
erally higher than for the SMHPS. The asymmetric struc-
ture of the AMHPS, on the other hand, makes its imple-
mentation harder than the SMHPS, since each crystal
much be fed a different pump intensity and the different
HS units must be carefully synchronized. Both archi-
tectures have shown a stronger dependence of the key
rate on optical switch transmittance than on detector ef-
ficiency.
The effect of multi-photon pulses, even if less impor-
tant than for the attenuated laser, still limits the maxi-
mum tolerable loss level. The use of the decoy state solves
this problem also for multiple-crystal heralded sources.
The best results are given by active decoy, where a vari-
able optical attenuator and a random number generator
are used to change the output statistics. The much more
complex statistics of these sources, however, makes the
calculations needed for the determination of the optimal
decoy parameters impractical. Therefore, the simplifying
assumption of exact determination of the parameters has
been adopted and the obtained results just give a supe-
rior limit on the attainable key rate. The optimal decoy
parameters must be calculated on a case by case basis,
once the characteristics of the source have been chosen.
These limitations might make it preferable the use of a
passive decoy scheme, which can be easily implemented in
both sources by exploiting the post-selection mechanism.
In this case, the optimization has taken into account also
the inefficiencies of parameter estimation, thus the ob-
tained results give the effective key rate attainable with
each configuration and not just a superior limit.
All the results here presented are subjected to the ap-
proximation of infinitely long key. We leave finite key
effects for future studies. These effects are important
especially for the schemes with decoy state, since each
photon statistics requires a sufficiently high number of
events. In the passive decoy scheme the effect is still
more important, since the need of considering also the
relative frequency of the two photon statistics can dras-
tically change the optimal source parameters.
The recent advances in integrated photonics suggest
an increasing role of multiple-crystal heralded sources.
If built into a single chip, they might be a valid alter-
native to lasers in quantum key distribution and other
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FIG. 10: Schematic of the MHPS [13]. Each non-linear crys-
tal (NLC) is fed with a pulse such that the mean number of
generated pairs is µ. The idler photon is fed into a detec-
tor (APD), while the signal one is routed through an optical
switch (O.S.) to the output.
quantum information tasks requiring single photons to
work properly. Our analysis show the supremacy of the
asymmetric scheme with respect to the symmetric one
for QKD applications.
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Appendix A: Multiple crystal heralded sources with
post-selection
The multiple crystal heralded source with post-
selection (MHPS) consists on an array of m HS units,
simultaneously pumped with a laser pulse with intensity
such that the mean number of generated pairs per pulse
is µ [13]. For each HS unit, labelled with index i = 1..m,
the idler photon is used as a trigger for the signal one,
which is injected into an optical switch, as shown in Fig-
ure 10. In the ideal case of perfect detector and optical
switch, a post-selection mechanism that selects one of
the channels whose detector has fired gives the output
statistics
PMn (µ;m) =
µn
n!
e−µ
1− e−mµ
1− e−µ (1− δn) + δne
−mµ, (A1)
where δn is the Kronecker Delta (δ0 = 1 and δn>0 = 0)
[16].
Taking into account real devices, the MHPS would face
the low efficiency of m-to-1 optical switches. This can
be avoided by replacing the m-to-1 switch with a tree
structure of 2-to-1 switches, giving the symmetric MHPS
(SMHPS) [11] shown in Figure 1.
The structure of this scheme requires the number of
HS units m to be a power of 2. The idler photon of each
HS unit is fed into a detector with quantum efficiency
η, while the signal photon is directed to a 2-to-1 optical
switch of transmittance γ. Since the photons produced
by each HS unit pass k = log2m switches before reaching
the output, the crystals are pumped with an intensity
such that the mean number of generated pairs per pulse
is µ/γk. The post-selection mechanism in each optical
switch gives priority to the left HS unit and, in case no
HS unit triggers, always outputs the left one [16]. The
photon statistics at the output is
PSn (µ;m, η, γ) =
(1− η)µe−(1−η)µ
n!
e
−ηµ 2k
γk
+
µne−µ
n!
1− (1− η)ne−η( 1γk−1)µ
1− e−η
µ
γk
(1− e−ηµ 2
k
γk ). (A2)
In the asymmetric MHPS (AMHPS), the m HS units are
arranged following the scheme shown in Figure 2 [16].
Each HS unit, whose idler photon is fed into a detector
of efficiency η, is pumped with an intensity such that
the mean number number of generated pair per pulse is
µ/γki , with
ki =
{
i i ≤ m− 1
m− 1 i = m, (A3)
in order to compensate the different number of traversed
2-to-1 optical switches. The post-selection mechanism of
each optical switch is the same as for the SMHPS, i.e.
it gives priority to the left HS unit and, if none triggers,
outputs the left one. Differently from the SMHPS, this
architecture requires delay lines to be introduced, in or-
der to compensate the longer transmission time of the
rightmost HS units [16]. The statistics at the output is
PAn (µ;m, η, γ) =
[(1− η)µ]e−(1−η)µ
n!
e−ηµ
(2−γ)γ1−m−1
1−γ
+
µne−µ
n!
m∑
i=1
e−ηµ
γ1−i−1
1−γ [1− (1− η)neηµe−
ηµ
γki ]. (A4)
Appendix B: Parameter estimation in passive decoy
state QKD
The parameters Y0, Y1 and e1, necessary in post-
processing, are not directly measured during the key ex-
change session, but must be estimated from the experi-
mental data Q and E. If Alice registers, for each pulse,
whether at least one or no detector has clicked, a differ-
ent gain and QBER for each case can be measured and
these can be used for parameter estimation. Since both
statistics depend on the same µ, parameter estimation
can be included in the general optimization process, thus
giving the real key rate and not just a superior limit.
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The probability that no detector clicks in a pulse is
Pnc(µ;m, η, γ) = e
−µη 2k
γk (B1)
for the SMHPS and
Pnc(µ;m, η, γ) = e−µη
(2−γ)γ1−m−1
1−γ (B2)
for the AMHPS, where k = log2m. The statistics in the
case of no click is the same for both sources (in both cases
the first HS unit is routed to the output) and is
P (nc)n =
[µ(1− η)]n
n!
e−µ(1−η), (B3)
while the statistics for the case of at least a detector click
is
P (c)n =
µne−µ
n!
[1− (1− η)ne−ηµ
(
1
γk
−1
)
]
1
1− e
−µη
γk
(B4)
for the SMHPS and
P (c)n =
µne−µ
n!
m∑
i=1
[1−(1−η)ne−µη
(
1
γki
−1
)
]
e−µη
γ1−i−1
1−γ
1− e−µη (2−γ)γ
1−m−1
1−γ
(B5)
for the AMHPS [16].
After the key exchange session, Alice tells Bob for
which pulses at least one detector has clicked, so that
they can estimate the gain and the QBER separately
for the two cases. From these values, referenced to as
{Qc, Ec, Qnc, Enc}, and the known source statistics P (c)n
and P
(nc)
n , they can estimate the parameters of the chan-
nel using the method described in [24].
The first parameter to be estimated is Y0. Its upper
bound Y U0 can be calculated starting from the relations
QcEc =
∞∑
n=0
P (c)n Ynen ≥ P (c)0 Y0e0 (B6)
QncEnc =
∞∑
n=0
P (nc)n Ynen ≥ P (nc)0 Y0e0. (B7)
Since both inequalities must hold, the parameter Y0 is
upper bounded by
Y0 ≤ Y U0 = min
{
QcEc
P
(c)
0 e0
,
QncEnc
P
(nc)
0 e0
}
. (B8)
Its lower bound Y L0 can be calculated from
P
(c)
1 Q
nc − P (nc)1 Qc =
∞∑
n=0
(P
(c)
1 P
(nc)
n − P (nc)1 P (c)n )Yn
≤ (P (c)1 P (nc)0 − P (nc)1 P (c)0 )Y0, (B9)
that gives
Y0 ≥ Y L0 = max
{
P
(c)
1 Q
nc − P (nc)1 Qc
P
(c)
1 P
(nc)
0 − P (nc)1 P (c)0
, 0
}
, (B10)
since, for both the SMHPS and the AMHPS
P
(c)
1 P
(nc)
n − P (nc)1 P (c)n =
An,1[(1− η)n − (1− η)]
{ ≤ 0 for n ≥ 2
≥ 0 for n = 0, (B11)
with An,1 a positive constant.
The lower bound on the single photon yield Y0 is cal-
culated starting from
P
(c)
2 Q
nc − P (nc)2 Qc =
∞∑
n=0
(P
(c)
2 P
(nc)
n − P (nc)2 P (c)n )Yn
≤
1∑
n=0
(P
(c)
2 P
(nc)
n − P (nc)2 P (c)n )Yn, (B12)
which leads to
Y1 ≥ Y L1 =
max
{
P
(c)
2 Q
nc − P (nc)2 Qc − (P (c)2 P (nc)0 − P (nc)2 P (c)0 )Y U0
P
(c)
2 P
(nc)
1 − P (nc)2 P (c)1
, 0
}
,
(B13)
since
P
(c)
2 P
(nc)
n − P (nc)2 P (c)n =
An,2[(1− η)n − (1− η)2]
{ ≤ 0 for n ≥ 2
≥ 0 for n ≤ 1 (B14)
with An,2 positive.
Similarly, the upper bound on e1 is calculated from
P
(nc)
0 Q
cEc − P (c)0 QncEnc =
∞∑
n=0
(P
(nc)
0 P
(c)
n − P (c)0 P (nc)n )enYn
≥ (P (nc)0 P (c)1 − P (c)0 P (nc)1 )e1Y1, (B15)
since
P
(nc)
0 P
(c)
n − P (c)0 P (nc)n = An,0[1− (1− η)n] ≥ 0 (B16)
for all n, and
QcEc =
∞∑
n=0
P (c)n Ynen ≥ P (c)0 Y0e0 + P (c)1 Y1e1,
(B17)
QncEnc =
∞∑
n=0
P (nc)n Ynen ≥ P (nc)0 Y0e0 + P (nc)1 Y1e1,
(B18)
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thus obtaining
e1 ≤ eU1 = min
{
P
(nc)
0 Q
cEc − P (c)0 QncEnc
(P
(nc)
0 P
(c)
1 − P (c)0 P (nc)1 )Y L1
,
QcEc − P (c)0 Y L0 e0
P
(c)
1 Y
L
1
,
QncEnc − P (nc)0 Y L0 e0
P
(nc)
1 Y
L
1
}
. (B19)
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